Identifying class size effects in developing countries : evidence from rural schools in Bolivia by Urquiola, Miguel
A JPSST  2  H
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2711
Identifying  Class Size Effects  Do smaller  classes  raise  test
scores?  Evidence  from rural
in Developing  Countries  schools in Bolivia  suggests
that they do.






















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2711
Summary findings
Although class size has attracted great interest as a policy  determine pupil-teacher ratios in rural areas, the author
instrument, inferences on its effects are controversial.  implements two research designs to deal with this issue.
Recent work highlights a particular way to consider the  The first uses a teacher allocation pattern as an
endogeneity issues that affect this variable: class size is  instrumental variable; the second relies on variation from
often correlated with enrollment, which may in turn be  remote schools with a single class per grade. Both suggest
related to socioeconomic status.  that class size has a negative effect on test sc,res.
In Bolivia, Urquiola shows, these correlations are
significant. Building from institutional arrangements that
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Policy makers in developing countries are increasingly interested  in raising educational
quality,  and  often  turn  to  economists for guidance  on how this  might  be  done.  Perhaps
surprisingly,  however, economic research sheds little  light  on how educational  authorities
should allocate  their  budgets,  at least with  respect  to what  inputs  they should emphasize.
In a survey of developing country studies, for instance, Hanushek (1995) suggests that  none
of the commonly studied school inputs  has a consistently  significant impact  on test scores. 1
In a review of this research, Kremer (1995) agrees that  the evidence on class size, a "popular"
input  because it can directly and quickly reflect policy, is particularly  weak. 2
The  source of disagreements  over the effect of class size and other  quality  measures is
simple:  these variables are typically  correlated  with  unobserved  factors that  also influence
educational  outcomes, a fact that  weakens inferences that  are not  based on credibly exoge-
nous variation.  To address this issue, recent research identifies quasi-experimental  situations
in which the variation  in some input is arguably  exogenous.  This  work includes Case and
Deaton  (1998) in the case of South  Africa, and Angrist  and  Lavy (1999) and  Lavy (1999)
for Israel.3 These last two papers  highlight a particular  way to think  about  endogeneity in
the case of class size.
Namely, this  variable  is often positively  related  to  enrollment,  which may in turn  be
correlated  with  socioeconomic status  (SES) and  achievement.  Lavy  (1995), for instance,
finds an enrollment/SES/achievement  link to  be an important  feature  in Israel, and  points
out  that  the  Coleman  (1966) report  includes  a  similar  finding for the  U.S. Closer to  the
subject  of this  paper,  MIizala et al.  (1999) argue enrollment  positively affects test scores in
Bolivia, a result they attribute  to economies of scale.
This paper first illustrates  why such correlations may be prevalent in developing coun-
tries, and  shows they  are indeed a relevant feature  in Bolivia.  Additionally,  it argues they
may partially  account for why conventional cross sectional analyses suggest that  larger classes
have no effect on or may even raise test scores, as reviewed in Hanushek  (1995). The paper
then addresses these endogeneity issues relying on two empirical strategies  that  emerge from
the institutional  arrangements  that  determine pupil/teacher  ratios in rural  Bolivia.
Using a  research  design  conceptually  similar  to  Angrist  and  Lavy's  (1999), the  first
approach  exploits  a teacher  allocation  practice  that  allows principals  whose schools have
classes with more than  30 students  to apply for an additional  teacher.  In the presence of this
mechanism, enrollment and  class size are not  "smoothly"  related, making it feasible to iden-
tify the latter's  effects using the resulting class size function as an instrumental  variable. In
1 These conclusions are broadly similar to those from an even more extensive survey Hanushek (1986)
presents for the U.S.
2 Other surveys are more optimistic about certain inputs'  effects. See  for instance Fuller (1986)  and Fuller
and Clarke (1994) for developing  countries, and Hedges,  Laine and Greenwald (1994) for the U.S.
3 These efforts are similar to research in the U.S. that  explicitly  explores the source of variation in some
input.  See for instance Finn and Achilles (1990), Akerhielm (1995), Boozer and Rouse (1995), Krueger
(1999),  and Hoxby (1999).
3short, this strategy  accepts the presence of an enrollment/SES  link, but identifies a situation
where the effects of class size can be potentially  separated  from those of enrollment
The  second strategy  considers only  rural locations  so small as to  have fewer than  30
students  in  a  single school with  only one  class per  grade.  Such  institutions  are located
in remote  areas  and  enjoy a  monopoly in  educational  supply,  greatly  reducing  the  scope
for parental  choice.  This,  combined  with  the fact  that  they  do not  qualify for adclitional
teachers,  implies  class size is largely  out  of their  authorities'  control.  These  factors may
jointly determine  that  the enrollment/SES  correlations that  cause bias in other  samples are
less significant in this  setting.  In contrast  with  the first  approach,  therefore,  this  sr.rategy
focuses on a  situation  where it is impossible to  isolate  class size from  enrollment  because
they  are in  fact  equal.  Instead,  it  relies on the  fact  that  in  comparisons between  remote
areas, enrollment/SES  correlations  may be less important  than  in broader  samples.
All variations  of these two approaches suggest class size has a negative and  significant
impact  on test  scores.  In most  cases, the  magnitude  of the implied effects is not  far  from
those  suggested  by Finn  and  Achilles (1990) and  Krueger  (1999) for the  Tennessee STAR
experiment,4 and by Angrist and  Lavy (1999) for Israel.  Additionally,  it is consisteilt with
the early-schooling effects emphasized by Hanushek  (1998) and Krueger  (1999).
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The next describes the data and
provides some background on Bolivia's educational  system.  Section 3 presents  the general
empirical framework and descriptive statistics,  Section 4 covers the empirical strategies,  and
Section 5 reviews results.  Section 6 concludes.
2  Background  and  data
Despite  a  recent  transfer  of educational  infrastructure  to  more  than  300 local gov-
ernments,  Bolivia  retains  a  relatively  centralized  public  educational  system,  in which the
Ministry  of Education  continues to hire all teachers and  set the curriculum.  At 100 percent,
the primary  gross enrollment  rate is close to that  in countries with  comparable incorne lev-
els.  Drop out  rates  are still  relatively  high,  however, and  secondary  enrollment  ratios are
therefore  considerably below those of similar countries.  Additionally, there  is a widespread
perception  that  for any given grade level, a substantial  proportion  of students  is no where
near mastery  of the grade-appropriate  skills.
In  response,  recent  governments  have  embarked  on  reforms  to  improve  quality  and
achieve further gains in access. As part of this effort, the Educational  Quality  Measurement
System  (SIMECAL)  was introduced  in  1993.  This  system  has  a  testing  progranm as  its
centerpiece, and  is the  main  source of data  for this  study.5 Each year,  SIMECAL focuses
on one or two grade levels in a sample of schools that  includes urban  private,  urban  public,
4 See Finn and Achilles (1999) and Hanushek (1999) for recent reassessments  of the STAR evidence.
5 See Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano (1997) for an introduction to the testing framework.
4and  rural public institutions;  private schools are very rare in the rural  area of Bolivia, and
are excluded from this  sample.
In  addition  to  gathering  language  and  math  test  data  on each  student,  the  system
collects information on his classroom and home background, as obtained  from questionnaires
administered  to:  the  student  himself, his teacher,  the  head  of his  household,  the  school
principal, and in the case of rural schools, some community leader.  This paper draws mainly
on test  scores and information collected from students  and household heads.
Since its inception, SIMECAL has reached grades 3, 6, 8, and 12. The results presented
below focus mainly on the  3 rd  grade, a choice made for three reasons:
1) Particularly  in the rural  area,  Bolivia still has a schooling supply  problem.  In a sig-
nificant proportion  of small towns, schools offer only the first three or four elementary
grades, so focusing on the lowest grade available increases coverage.
2) The fact that  inputs  have cumulative  effects causes a well known complication in edu-
cational  production  function analyses.  Because the  3rd  is the lowest of the grade levels
available,  its  test  scores are less likely to  be  "tainted"  by previous  input  availability.
This  complication  also provides  an  argument  for the  focus on  "small"  rural  schools
that  distinguishes  one of the  identification  strategies  proposed,  since in  these cases,
between-year changes in enrollment  and  class size will tend  to  be small,  so that  the
input of interest  is more likely to have been held constant  during  students'  careers.
3)  As stated,  relatively few students  reach secondary education in Bolivia, and differential
drop-out  rates  could bias inferences on class size.  This is naturally  less of an issue at
the  3rd  than  at the other  available grade levels.
3  Empirical  framework  and  descriptive  statistics
Historically, developing countries  have devoted great  efforts to  enhance  their  popula-
tions'  access to  education.  Over the  years, however, papers  such as Behrman  and  Birdsall
(1983) and Case and Yogo (1999) have suggested that  the returns  to educational  investments
are not independent  of school quality.6 The emergence of such results,  combined with  the
perception  that  improving schools can help to  eliminate remaining  enrollment  deficits, ex-
plains why researchers  have attempted  to identify  inputs  that  raise achievement,  and why
class size, one which policy can quickly influence, has received such attention.
As stated,  significant controversy  surrounds  inferences on these effects, primarily be-
cause the extent  to  which different students  enjoy particular  inputs  is probably  related to
other characteristics  that  affect achievement. In the case of class size, recent literature  sug-
gests that  considering how enrollment/class  size and  enrollment/SES  correlations affect the
analysis, is a useful way to think  about such sources of bias.
6  These  findings are  similar  to  others  that  apply  to  high-income  countries,  such  as those  presented  by
Card  and  Krueger  (1992).
5Specifically, if  enrollment  and  class size are positively  related,  and  enrollment  is  in
turn  correlated  with  SES,  cross-sectional studies  will not  reveal  the  causal  effect of class
size.  Lavy (1995) and  Angrist  and  Lavy (1999) emphasize this  point  for Israel, a-d  note
that  an enrollment/SES  correlation  is also relevant in the U.S., as pointed  out  by Col3man
(1966) and Hedges et al. (1994). They also suggest its presence may bias Akerhielm's  (1995)
conclusions.  In  the  case of Bolivia,  Mizala  et  al.  (1999) use cross sectional  evidence to
suggest enrollment raises achievement, hypothesizing this may be due to economies of scale.
This  section  illustrates  one way these correlations  arise and  complicate  inferer.,ces  on
class size in the  case of Bolivia, and  more generally  argues they may be  relevant in other
developing countries.  For this purpose,  it is useful to  note that  most empirical  work begins
with the  assumption,  often dictated  by data  availability, that  the  jth  class in school k has
size:
nk
where Ek  is total  enrollment  in the school, and  nk  is the number of classes.  For notational
simplicity, all these variables are assumed to  be grade specific.
A first  aspect  to  consider is why enrollment  and  class size would be  related,  since, if
they are not,  any additional  enrollment/SES  relation will not necessarily pose problems. The
setting  in which the clearest association  arises is among sparsely populated  rural  lccations
where schools may have only one 3 rd  grade, so that  enrollment  and  class size are perfectly
correlated.  This point  is evident  in Figure  1, which applies formula (1), plotting  class size
against enrollment  for all schools in the sample.  For very small institutions  towards the left
of the  diagram,  the two variables  are identical.  The  figure also illustrates  that  a positive
association remains over most ranges of enrollment, if only that  which arises from conmiparing
the small and larger establishments.
Beyond  the factors  that  actually  cause a  positive  enrollment/class  size link,  -. he key
point here is that  with  this relation present, any additional  enrollment/SES  correlations will
potentially  bias  inferences on class size.  The simplest  way to see how these  can originate
once again involves comparing  relatively  small and  large schools.  Because the former will
generally be located in rural  and the  latter  in urban  areas, any welfare differences between
these two realms will give rise to an  enrollment/SES  correlation.  This  aspect  is relevant in
developing countries, where  for instance,  income  per capita  is often significantly higher in
urban  centers than  in sparsely  populated  rural areas.
Figure  2 illustrates  this  point  using information  on mothers'  educational  attainment.
Specifically, the  figure plots  enrollment  and  the  fraction  of children  in  each  class  whose
mothers completed less than five years of schooling, suggesting the following observations:
1) There is a concentration  of rural public classes towards the left of the diagram, refecting
the fact that  they are more often in schools with  low enrollments.  In contrast  urban
classes, both public and  private,  are more evenly distributed.
62)  A significant proportion  of rural  classes are in the upper  part  of the graph,  indicating
that  relatively few of their students'  mothers completed more than  five years of school-
ing.  In  contrast,  classes from  urban  and  particularly  private  institutions  are more
clustered  towards  the bottom  of the  figure, indicating  children in these schools come
from households with greater  educational  attainment.
3)  To summarize these two points, the figure displays a negative linear relation suggesting
that  at least as measured by mothers'  schooling, children in larger schools come from
higher SES backgrounds.
Using  3 rd  grade  class-level data,  figures 3 and  4 present an  additional  illustration  of
enrollment/SES  correlations.  The  first  of these  shows relative  frequency  distributions  of
enrollment by type of school.  As expected, urban  classes (the ones covered in the top  two
panels) display relatively  normal  distributions,  with  many schools having between 50 and
150 3  rd  grade students.  More than  70 percent  of rural  public  schools, in  contrast,  have
enrollments below 50.
Figure  4 complements  this  information  showing the  distribution  of the proportion  of
students  in  each  class who declare  they  speak  only  Spanish.  This  is  a relevant  trait  in
Bolivia, where  a  significant percentage  of the  population  still  uses native  languages  with
varying degrees of intensity.7 Although  the current  educational reform stresses multicultural
education  and  a  new bilingual  testing  system  is in  place,  the  tests  considered  here were
administered  in Spanish, and most  instruction  still takes place in this language.  In general,
furthermore,  Spanish-only  speakers display higher SES than  native  language users.
This figure shows that  a significant majority  of children in the urban  area, particularly
in the private sector, speak only Spanish, but  that  there is a greater  prevalence of indigenous
languages in the rural  area.  For instance  more than  one in three  rural  classes contains less
than  50 percent  Spanish-only  speakers,  while there  are almost  no such  cases in the  urban
area.  Combined with the  information  in Figure 3, this  data  once again suggests a positive
enrollment/SES  link.'
To summarize,  figures  2-4 have shown that  the  enrollment/achievement  correlations
that  Mizala et al.  (1999) emphasize may arise not  from economies of scale but  from enroll-
ment/SES  correlations.  Figures 5 and 6 suggest they may also reflect positive links between
enrollment  and  the  availability  of  "better"  inputs  beyond  class size.  To make this  point,
they focus on the distribution  of the proportion  of teachers  who declare that  more than  half
of their students  have textbooks,  and the proportion  who are in the top  three  categories of
the pay scale. 9 Combined with the enrollment distributions  previously displayed, these data
7 The two main indigenous  languages are Aimara  and  Quechua.  Alb6 (1995) estimates  that  slightly more
than  half of the entire  population  has  some command  of one of these.
8 It might seem surprising  that  simultaneously,  Figure  4 suggests there  is a significant  proportion  of rural
classes where  Spanish-only  speakers  are as prevalent  as  in the  urban  areas.  This  heterogeneity  in the  rural
distribution  partially  reflects geographic  variation,  namely, the  presence of schools from  the  eastern  part  of
the country,  where the prevalence  of indigenous languages  is low even in agricultural  settings.
9 Bolivia's public educational  system has a rigid pay scale which classifies teachers  according  to seniority
7again  suggest  that  children  in  larger  schools  generally  enjoy  "better"  inputs.
The  preceding  examples  have  all motivated  the  existence  of enrollnient/SES  corrc,!ations
as  a  reflection  of rural/urban  differences.  These  links  may  also  arise  withinr  urbanl  areas,
however,  if  some  schools  are  more  "efficient"  in  the  sense  of being  better  able  to  ra: se test
scores,  and  if, additionally,  higher  SES  parents  are  better  able  to  identify  such  instituttions.
This  type  of "competition"  effect,  emphasized  by  Hoxby  (1997) in the  case  of the  U.S.,  may
be  important  in  Bolivia  because  the  country  has  an  "open"  public  educational  systemn, so
that  admission  to a particular  school  involves no  residential  requirements. 10 This  detc rrnines
that  some public  schools  perceived  to  be better  by parents,  are oversubscribedl.  To ili  -strate,
in the  days  surrounding  admittance  periods,  a few schools  in major  Bolivian  c(ities ha-;e some
parents  physically  queuing  up  to  several  days  to  get  their  children  elirolled.  To  the  extent
that  higher  SES  or  more  motivated  parents  are  the  ones who  engage  in  such  behavior,  this
may  also  induce  the  mentioned  enrollment/SES  and  enrollment/achievement  correlai;ons.
These  sorting  and  "competition"  effects  are  probably  reinforced  by  the  availability  of
religious  public  schools,  a  trait  shared  with  several  Latin  American  countries.  These  in-
stitutions  are  generally  physically  owned  and  run  by  a  religious  denominationl  (mllost often
the  Catholic  Church),  but  their  teachers  are  supplied  and  paid  for  by  the  State.  I.ke  all
publicly-funded  schools,  they  do  not  charge  direct  fees.  There  is  evidence  they  hav-! more
effective  incentive  systems,  that  parents  perceive  them  as better,  and( they  are  on  r verage
oversubscribed  more  frequently  than  public  schools  without  religious  affiliations.
Regardless  of the  precise  origins  of the  enrollment/class  size  and  enrollment/SF  S cor-
relations  this  section  has  discussed,  it  is clear  that  in  their  presence  it  may  be  impossible
to  identify  class  size  effects  using  cross-sectional  variation.  In  particular.  these  links  may
bias  estimates  upward,  suggesting  this  variable  may  have  less of a negative  effect  than  inight
actually  be  the  case.  The  descriptive  statistics  in  Table  1 illustrate  this  point.  Thi-  table
presents  information  on  the  whole  sample  of schools,  and  also  on  each  type  of institution:
urban  private,  urban  public,  and  rural  public.
A  first  point  is the  ordering  of average  test  scores  in both  subjects:  students  in  uirban
private  schools  place  highest,  followed by those  in urban  public  and  rural  public  instit.itions.
As expected,  the  table  also shows that  urban  and  particularly  private  school  students  (lisplay
"better"  socioeconomic  characteristics  and  enjoy  "higher  quality"  inputs.  The  key  point  is
that  at  the  same  time,  average  class  size is highest  in  the  urban  private  sector,  followed  by
the  urban  public  and  rural  public  cases,  so  that  a comparison  of means  would  suggest  larger
classes  in fact  produce  better  outcomes.
In  this  context,  the  fact  that  higher  SES  children  are  often  in  larger  classes  nma, seem
surprising.  It  is important  to  realize,  however,  that  the  class  size  levels  childreni expe':ience
are  the  result  of  a  complex  decision  process  in  which  parents  may  consider  not  on  fi this
and formal qualifications. See Urquiola et al.  (2000)  for detail.
10  There have recently been attempts  to introduce residential controls, but. anecdotal evi.deuice  ijilicates
these are either not enforced or ineffective.
8variable's  level (or even that  of other  educational  inputs),  but  also aspects  such as their
children's peer group composition.  If one adds to this the fact that  schools have cost-related
incentives to  keep  class sizes high,  it  is clear  that  no straightforward  predictions  on the
relation betweein, say, inicome,  and class size will be available.
To sunmmarize,  the simple information presented in this section shows that  biases arising
from a combination  of enrollrment/class size and  enrollment/SES  correlations  will typically
affect inferences about  class size in countries like Bolivia.  The following section introduces
the  empirical strategies  used to  deal with this  problem,  and to  address  the endogeneity of
class size more generally.
4  Empirical  strategies
Miost work on class size begins from a reduced  form specification which assumes that
the test score T  of an individual  i in class j, school k, and town I is given by
Tijkl  a  a  ,+c'Cjkl + XijklO,  + XjklO, 3 + Xkkl3 k  +  Xd3X + Eijkl,  (2)
where Aijkl  is a. vector of studenits' socioeconomic characteristics,  Xjkl  denotes traits  specific
to given classes, such as teachers'  qualifications, Xkl  refers to  school characteristics,  and XI
stands  for town-level variables, like population  size (CIJkl is as defined in formula 1, page 6).
The previous section  illustrated  that  in any practical  application,  the X  vectors are likely
to exclude key characteristics  that  affect achievement, and  being correlated  with class size,
will bias estimates  of !c.
Another way of stating  this  is that  while class size may be given simply by the ratio of
enrollment and  the number of classes offered, as in (1), in reality both  of these are affected
by socioeconomic characteristics:
Ckl  =  Eki(Xijkl,  Xk,  Xl  eijkl)  (3)
nkl(Ekl, Xijkl, Xkl, XI, Eijkl)
Placing  these variables  iIn the  numerator  of this  expression makes explicit the  possible en-
rollment/SES  correlations  illustrated  in the previous section.  That  they  also belong in the
denominator  is evident in Figure  1 which shows that  not  only does class size vary with en-
rollment, but  schools with identical enrollment levels often choose to  offer different numbers
of classes, a decision which may naturally  reflect traits  like income levels.
Both  (2) and  (3) make clear that  reliably identifying class size effects will necessitate
experimental  or  quasi-experimental  evidence.  The  previous  section  suggested  that  a way
of thinking  about  this  requirement  is that  one must  have situations  where either:  i)  class
size and  enrollment  are  unrelated,  or at  a minimum,  ii) enrollment  and  SES correlations
9are less prevalent than  in the aggregate sample.'"  This section argues that  the institutional
characteristics  of educational  provision in the rural  area of Bolivia make these approaches
feasible, and presents  two empirical strategies  that  implement them,  one at  a time.
Before proceeding  to  these  identification  issues, however, it  is relevant  to  mention  a
measurement  problem.  Boozer and  Rouse (1995) emphasize that  calculating  class size by
equation  (1), as is actually  done in this  study  and  is illustrated  in Figure  1, can result in
bias.  They  illustrate  this  possibility by noting that  some school districts  in the  U.S. have
compensatory  policies that  place worse-performing students  in smaller classes, so that  using
actual  class sizes rather  than  some school average is necessary for accurate  inferences.
This  measurement  problem  is fortunately  not  a  major  issue  in  the  present  setting.
First,  the  SIMECAL system  provides both  measure (1), collected from school officials, and
the actual  number of pupils  teachers declare are in their classes.  Figure  7 shows that  these
two measures are in fact very similar: most observations are very close to  a hypothetical  45
degree line that  would indicate  they  are identical.  This  is particularly  the  case amcng the
rural schools that  are the focus of this  study.
This reflects that  in Bolivia, schools often have only the number of teachers they strictly
need to  cover the grade  levels offered. In the extreme, schools in smaller  communitWes  will
have only one class per  grade level, and  will rarely  have a principal  or any  administrative
staff.12 As in  many low-income countries,  therefore,  making  subtle  adjustments  to  actual
class sizes, or offering compensatory  education,  will rarely if ever be in public schools' choice
set.  Additionally, the focus here is on primary education, where class size tends to be ,a  more
clearly defined concept  than  in later  schooling stages.1 3
If based on this  logic one ignores the measurement  problem, then  C need not have a j
or class subscript,  and  (2) takes the form:
Tijk1 =  O +  cCCkl  +  ±  1A  + Xjkl/  +  XkklO  +  XUlX  +  fijkl,  (4)
where class size, conditional  on grade level, will depend only on the school students  are in.
This will certainly be the case in small institutions  which have one class per grade. With  this
measurement  issue aside, the following sections present the mentioned empirical strategies.
4.1  Teacher  allocation  patterns  as  an  instrumental  variable
Following Angrist  and Lavy (1999), a first approach exploits the fact that  teachers are
allocated in a centralized manner  in Bolivia.  Under prevailing practice, when a given c istrict
11  SES and  class size could  of course  still be  correlated  through  mechanisms  other  than  those  operating
through  enrollment.
12  There  will generally  be  a  "district  principal"  who serves several  small schools fromn  a larger  toAn.  As
stated,  the  system  is still  relatively  centralized,  and  these districts  have little  autonomy.
13  The  data  consistency  displayed  in Figure  7 also  matters  to  the  extent  one  may  be  concerned  that
administrative  data  in  developing  countries  is not  reliable.  Anecdotal  evidence indicates  that  edu  ational
reform efforts have resulted  in more accurate  reporting  in Bolivia.
10can demonstrate  one of its  schools has more than  30 students  per teacher in a given grade,
it can apply to the Ministry  of Education  for another teacher, thus lowering the class size at
that  school (for the given grade) significantly. For now, the discussion assumes a situation  in
which this rule binds without  exception, that  is, districts  always request  a teacher, and one
is always granted,  when they reach a class size of 30.  Further  below, this  section presents
evidence on the extent  to which this procedure  actually binds.
Mathematically,  this practice determines that  the number of classes a public school can
offer, n*,,  is a discontinuous function of its enrollment:
n*1  f  f(Eki)  intEk<)  + 1 k  . ( ~~Ekl-  +
Graphically,  Figure  8 illustrates  the  impact  of this  regulation  on the  relation  between en-
rollment  and  class size.  Up to  30 students,  these  two variables  take  on identical  values;
thereafter,  (5) causes class size to fall discretely at enrollment intervals of 30 students.
In terms  of an  identification  strategy,  the  relevant consequence is that  if the teacher
allocation procedure  is always binding, equation  (3) becomes
Ckl  =  Ekl (Xijkl,  Xkl,  Xi,  Eijkl)  (6)
nk,l
the key change being that  neither  X nor e now affect schools' choice of n.  Graphically, this
is seen comparing figures 1 and 8.  When a rule like (5) applies, two schools with the same
enrollment level will never have different class sizes.
This change does not succeeded, however, in eliminating X and e from the class size de-
termination  equation,  since they still act through  Ekl. Nevertheless, as long as achievement
and  enrollment  are  "smooth"  functions  of these  two  variables,  (5)  still  provides  useful  varia-
tion.  The argument  behind this,  as put forth  by Angrist  and Lavy (1999), is an application
of the  quasi-experimental  regression discontinuity  design introduced  by  Campbell  (1969),
who analyzed how to identify  the effect of a treatment  variable (in this case, class size) as-
signed on the basis of an  observed continuous measure (in this  case, enrollment),  called the
selection variable.  Because the selection variable itself may be related to  the outcome  (e.g.
through  the enrollment/SES  correlations described  above), the treatment  variable could be
statistically  related to  the outcome even if the relationship  is not causal.
The  logic is that  if  enrollment  is  smoothly  related  to  SES,  observations  in  narrow
intervals around discontinuities provide a quasi-experimental  setting because the sample right
above each "tooth"  in Figure 8 should be very similar to the one right below. It is therefore
plausible  that  any  variation  in  their  outcomes  is caused  by  differences in  the  treatment
variable.  In terms of equation  (4), using this  rule involves utilizing  (5) to  instrument  Ckt,
running a regression like:
Tijkl  =  a  +  /CCkl  +  Xijkl3X  + OE-Ekl +  Eijkl,  (7)
11where  Ckl  denotes instrumented  class size, Ek,j is some  "smooth"  function  of enrollment,
possibly ln(EkL) or enrollment itself, and the control variables have been combined into Xijki
for simplicity.
To check how useful the mentioned teacher  allocation  procedure  can be as an  instru-
mental variable, a simple first step is to  observe whether average test  scores, when plotted
against  enrollment,  display an  up  and  down  "saw tooth"  behavior  inverse  to  thal  which
characterizes the  class size function in Figure  8.  In the case of Israel, for instance,  Angrist
and  Lavy (1999) show that  this  is clearly the case, pointing  out  it is difficult to  attribute
such behavior to anything  but  the variation in class size induced by the class size ru]e they
use in that  context.
For the  present data,  this  exercise is shown for the rural area in Figure  9. For reasons
discussed later  in this  section, the  teacher allocation  procedure  described  is not  binding in
urban  areas.  The top  portion  of this  illustration  graphs  average actual  and predicted  class
sizes by enrollment levels, and the bottom  plots  averages of math  and language scores, also
by enrollment levels. The figure suggests several observations.
First,  the actual does not always track  the predicted class size. Rather  than  starting  to
assign new teachers at grade-specific enrollment levels of 30, the data suggest authorities seem
to wait until about 38 students,  which may reflect resource constraints.  This also illustrates
that  the teacher  allocation  mechanism reflects practice  rather  than  a  legally binding rule.
There are aspects that  reflect a commitment  to implicitly limiting class sizes, however. For
instance,  the Social Investment  Fund, the  agency in charge of building  schools in the rural
area,  explicitly  designs its  classrooms  for  30 students.  This  guideline,  mandated  by  the
Ministry of Education,  is also observed by the main Non-Governmental  Organizations active
in school construction.
What is important  for the purposes of this  paper, is that  at a given level (about  38 stu-
dents) actual class sizes seem to drop for most schools, i.e., by enrollments of 40 most schools
have been assigned a new teacher,  creating  the clear  discontinuity  observed  in this  range.
The absence of a discontinuity would be evidence that  teacher allocation is more endogenous
than the straightforward  application of a teacher allocation rule would suggest.  The fact that
not  all new teachers  are assigned at exactly the same enrollment  level, nevertheless,  makes
it impossible to completely discount biases.  Additionally, some further  "spikes" observed at
greater enrollment levels may also be a cause for concern.
There is another  perhaps  clearer discontinuity at about  65 students,  but  beyond enroll-
ments of about  72 students  the teacher  allocation rule ceases to  predict class size effectively.
The greater  variability  observed in part  reflects smaller sample sizes in  this  data,  but  may
also be due to  the fact  that  towns with  such enrollment  levels begin to  become more  "ur-
ban".  Considering the  rural  area as a whole, nevertheless,  the described  teacher allooation
procedure is a relevant practice  which accounts for 40 to 50 percent  of the variation  in class
sizes, an explanatory  power similar to that  observed in the Israeli case.
Turning  to the  test  scores, even though  these are  not smoothed  and  the  samples are
12small relative to those used in other studies, the figure displays a suggestive pattern  generally
inverse to that  observed for class size. In the first segment, that  which covers enrollment levels
from zero to about  38, there is a clear negative relation  between test scores and class size.
Much of this  arises from the small rural schools that  are the focus of the next identification
strategy,  so a more complete discussion of this evidence is postponed.
More importantly  for the current  research design, at almost the precise level where the
teacher  allocation  rule causes  class sizes to  fall discretely, test  scores jump  abruptly.  Al-
though  the  behavior  of scores between the  two discontinuities  is more erratic,  the  overall
pattern  is still  suggestive of an  inverse relation.  Additionally,  test  scores jump  again  at
about the enrollment level (66-68 students)  where there is another  discrete reduction in class
sizes. Beyond this last enrollment level, test scores begin to decline again with enrollment, al-
though not as clearly as in the previous segments. This may partially reflect enrollment/SES
correlations that  begin to become more important  as towns become larger and more urban,
an aspect  further discussed below. A final point is that  the behavior of both  tests  is rather
similar, which is not  always a feature of studies  that  cover more than  one subject  score.
As  mentioned,  this  identification  strategy  focuses only  on  the  rural  area,  Although
excluding  the  urban  realm  eliminates  a  significant part  of the  sample,  this  restriction  is
necessary because  the  practices  described  do not  bind  in this  case.  This  much is already
evident  in the  descriptive  statistics  presented  in Table  1, which show that  the  mean  class
size in  urban  public  schools is close to  36 (with  a standard  deviation  of 6),  a level that
is inconsistent  with  a similar  rule's  application.  The mean  class size in the  rural  area,  in
contrast,  is 23 students,  with  a standard  deviation of 8.
The are no immediately apparent  reasons for this asymmetry  in the allocation of teach-
ers, or for the between-area  differences in per pupil expenditures  it implies." 4 Nevertheless,
the following points are relevant to an explanation:
1) The  existence of sparsely  populated  rural  areas implies that  educational  authorities
must  necessarily  be  willing to  tolerate  lower class  sizes in  this  segment in  order  to
achieve given target  national  enrollment  ratios.  While  this  helps  explain the  urban-
rural differences in average class sizes, it does not account for why the teacher allocation
guidelines would be differentially enforced.
2)  As indicated,  Bolivia has an  "open" public school system,  so that  admission to a par-
ticular school involves no residential requirements.  This makes urban  enrollments hard
to predict  and may render any rule hard  to apply, even if that  is what the educational
authorities  wanted  to do.
3) The fact that  the  mean  urban  class size is significantly larger than  30, however, calls
into question whether  authorities  actually  pursue this goal, which may in turn  have to
do with  resource constraints  that  have different implications  in each area.
4)  Specifically, the  kinds and  costs  of teachers  the Ministry  assigns to each area are dif-
14 As in many developing  countries, the majority of Bolivia's education budget is devoted to salaries, so
that student/teacher ratios are an important part of the overall resource allocation picture.
13ferent,  which  may  explain  its  apparent  greater  willingness  to  spend  on  teachers  and
implicitly  enforce  an allocation  rule in the rural  area.  Differences  in the  types  of l ,achiers
are relevant  because  there  is a shortage  of certified  instructors.  Because  this  sitLation  is
most  acute  in rural  regions,  regulations  allow authorities  to  appoint  "interin"  teachers
in these  areas.  These  are  individuals  who  do  not  have  a  teaching  certificate,  and  will
often  not  have  finished  high  school.  In many  cases,  they  are  natives  of the  conmunity
they  serve.  All these  traits  determine  they  are also  at  the  bottom  of the  national  pay
scale,  and  are  therefore  more  available  and  less expensive  than  the  certified  instructors
authorities  more  often  assign  to  the  urban  area.15
Combined,  these  factors  may  explain  why  teacher  allocation  seems  to  be more  systeriatic  in
the  rural  area,  and  why  the  average  class size is lower  in this  realm.
In sum.  this  figure  suggests  than  an instrumental  variables  approach  like that  suc-,gested
b)y (7) may  produce  results  different  from  those  observed  in conventional  OLS specifieations.
These  are  presented  in  Section  5 below,  where  the  the  allocation  rule  used  is  thalI  which
effectively  binds,  with  a discontinuity  at  about  38 students.
4.2  Focusing  on  small  towns
As Angrist  and  Lavy  (1999)  point  out  and  Hoxby  (1999)  emphasizes,  the  IV  approach
suggested  by  (7)  may  be  appropriate  only  at  the  discontinuLities  induced  by  a  given  class
size  rule.  Regarding  the  present  data,  this  implies  the  strategy  may  only  be  valid  wheni
considering  observations  within  some  narrow  interval  of the  enrollment  levels  thaL  cause
abrupt  drops  in  class  size,  since  it  is only  around  such  discontinuities  that  any  "smooth"
enrollment/class  size link is really  severed.  Actually  implementing  this  adjustment,  however,
is likely to  cause  the  loss of many  if not  most  observations  in cross-sectional  data  sei,s.
Nevertheless,  to  the  extent  that  the  research  focus  is on  rural  schools,  it may  nct  mnake
sense  to  consider  only  the  variation  within  such  bands.  Specifically,  there  may  be  valuable
information  in the  observations  up  to  the  first  "tooth"  of the  enrollment/class  size retation,
when  that  arises from  towns  so small  as  to have  a single public  school with  only  one  c':ass per
grade.  Such  communities  will be  referred  to  as  "small  towns"  in  the  subsequent  disc  ssion,
and  their  value  in this  setting  arises  from  a number  of observations:
1)  Given  the  teacher  allocation  procedure  and  prevalent  educational  supply  restrrctions,
public  schools  in  these  locations  have  a  monopoly  on  formal  schooling,  and  parents
essentially  have  no  choice  between  institutions  or  classes.  This  reflects  that  private
schools  are  very  rare  in the  rural  area  and,  when  they  exist,  are  almost  always  l,o)cated
in  large  towns  that  can  support  a  religious  institution  alongside  one  or  more  public
ones.
15 There  are  also  "interim"  instructors  in  cities,  but  their  prevalence  is much  low-er. This  reflects  -he  fact
that  most  teachers  seem  to  prefer  to  live  in  cities,  and  that  those  that  have  degrees  have  greater  c!joice  on
their  geographical  assignment.
142)  The statement  that  parents cannot exercise choice must be qualified because they could
always move in reaction to an observed class size. While this  is possibly an important
concern for Hoxby (1999) given the mobility and  proximity  that  exists between U.S.
school districts  (particularly  in a small state  like Connecticut),  and  for Lavy (1999),
given the population  density and relatively small area of Israel, it may be less of an issue
in rural  Bolivia.  In this  case, migrating  does not  imply switching  areas of residence
while possibly keeping the same job, but  may require attempting  to sell land on which
there  are often no clear property  rights,  and moving to  a  relatively  distant  location,
an  aspect  that  is  reinforced  because schools are generally  few and  far  apart.  This
motivation  is similar to that  used by Case and Deaton (1998), who exploit Apartheid-
imposed mobility restrictions  to identify resource effects in South Africa.
3)  Because schools in small towns clearly do not qualify for additional  teachers, school offi-
cials will have almost no latitude  to alter class sizes or "campaign" for more instructors.
This may be  an important  advantage relative to the  previous strategy,  particularly  if
one is concerned  about  possible manipulations  of the teacher  allocation  rule around
the discontinuity-inducing  enrollment levels.
In light of these observations, the class size a student  in a small town experiences will be
almost solely determined by his or her cohort size. In terms of Angrist and Lavy (1999), this
is a situation  where the assignment  and treatment variables are one and the same, but may
nevertheless have some relevant exogeneity characteristics.  Formally, this  approach entails
running  an OLS regression of the form:
Tijkl  =  Ci + ICCkl  + Xijkl 3X  +  3E*Ek,J +  Eijkl,  where  0 < EkI  < 31.  (8)
where the focus on small rural  locations leaves little  room for biases arising from within or
between-school differences in a given community. Following what  would be a strict  applica-
tion of this rule, this specification  calls for placing the cutoff at 30 students,  while Figure 9
could be interpreted  as arguing for a higher cutoff, perhaps  around  38 students.  The results
below use the  lower benchmark,  but  were not  found to  be sensitive to  this  choice; if any-
thing,  the key coefficients are more significant with a higher cutoff point.  The lower cutoff
was used,  however, because  as discussed further  it makes it more likely that  small towns
(with only one class per school and  one school per  town) are being selected.
This use of between-town  variation,  of course, does not  eliminate  all possible sources
of bias.  Even in this  small town sample,  larger locations  will tend  to  have larger  cohorts,
enrollments, and class sizes. Additionally, these could systematically  attract  better  or worse
teachers than  smaller ones. To express this point formally, note that  under  the above argu-
ments, class size will be given not  by (3) but  rather  by:
C  l= '(XI  61).  (9)
where n  is now set  to  1.  The  absence  of subscripts  j  and  k  reflects  there  is only  one
15class and  one school in each town indexed by 1. Class level characteristics,  Xkl.  have been
eliminated  for the  same reason, whereas  the absence of student  and  parental  traits,  kijkh
reflects the assumption that  parents can no longer influence achievement through  their choice
of school.  The presence of Xi, however, indicates that  inter-town  heterogeneity  coLNd  still
bias inferences if it is correlated  with factors that  affect achievement.  This  is anot.-ier way
of stating  that  there  could still  be  enrollment/SES/achievement  correlations,  eve.r]  if the
enrollment variation  arises from differences in towns'  sizes rather  than  differences between
schools. While this is certainly  possible, the results  below suggest that  the biases that  arise
from this  are probably  less severe.
4.3  Combining  the  allocation  rule  and  the  focus  on  small  towns
If the  above arguments  hold  and  the  variation  among  small  towns is meaningful,  a
logical extension  is to  combine the two previous research designs.  In this  case, the t;trategy
focuses only on rural schools with enrollments less than  or equal to 30 (those in small towns),
on the one hand,  and  on those with  enrollments within narrow  bands of levels that  trigger
discontinuities  in the enrollment/class  size relation,  on the other.  This reflects that  having
small town schools as a base provides a sample size large enough to then restrict  the remaining
observations to those which provide  "higher quality"  variation.  Specifically, the approach in
this case is,
Tiikl  =  a  +  fC(Cki +  Xi,kjlx  +  3E Ek*j + eijkl,  where  0 <  EkI  < 45  or  (10)
63 <  Ekl  < 68
and  the  instrumental  variables  technique  binds  only  for schools with  enrollments  greater
than  30.  In practice,  the  results  were not  found to  be  significantly sensitive to  the exact
placement  of these cutoff points.
The  next  section  presents  results  on these  identification  strategies.  It  also  l'eatures
brief evidence on a  couple of additional  methods  that  address  sources  of endogeneAty  the
two  approaches  discussed here  do  not.  Because  these  are  not  central  to  the  parer,  the
methodological details  are briefly discussed within the results section itself.
5  Results
For comparison  purposes,  this  section  first  presents  results  that  apply to  all schools
considered, including those in the urban  samples.  The regressions then implement the iden-
tification  strategies  described  in the  previous section, which,  as stated,  focus only cn  rural
area schools.
165.1  General  results
To introduce results on class size and enrollment, Table 2 presents simple cross sectional
specifications for the full sample and  each type of school: urban  private,  urban  public, and
rural  public.  Panel A has  class size as the key independent  variable.  In this  case, column
1 suggests larger classes in fact produce  higher test  scores, a statistically  significant result
which is not surprising given the correlations discussed above. Such a positive point estimate
is also observed among urban  private  schools in column 3.  When column 2 focuses on the
full sample and adds dummies for whether schools are in the private sector or the rural area,
the  coefficient on  class size becomes  negative and  significant.  The  result  is even greater
in  magnitude  when the  regression considers only public schools in  columns 4 and  5.  The
signs of all coefficients are the  same in panel B, except that  the focus is on enrollment as
the key independent  variable.  As expected, the results suggest enrollment  positively affects
achievement in the aggregate sample.
Before proceeding to  the rural-only results,  Table 3 makes the  point that  results in all
areas behave in a manner  consistent with Hanushek (1995). This table  once again considers
the  full sample,  urban  private,  urban  public  and  rural  public schools.  For each of these
groups, the first regression simply replicates the corresponding simple specification observed
in Table 2. The second one adds a number of socioeconomic controls, which have the effect
of lowering the  coefficients on class size and rendering  them  insignificant  at  the 5 percent
level.  16
The socioeconomic control variables,  in contrast,  almost always have effects in the ex-
pected  direction and are highly significant in the aggregate sample.  Students  who are native
Spanish  speakers  have  higher scores;  working tends  to  lower performance,  and  mothers'
schooling to  improve it.  Two characteristics,  whether households  have access to  sewerage
and  phone  connections,  turn  out  to  be highly significant, perhaps  because  they proxy for
income and urban  status.
5.2  Rural  area  results:  the  teacher  allocation  rule
With these introductory  results  as a benchmark, the remainder of the regressions focus
on different subsets of rural schools only.  Additionally, while the  previous  results  covered
only language  test  scores, the  subsequent  cover math  as well.  Introducing  the  use of the
teacher  allocation  rule  and  following Angrist  and  Lavy (1999), Table  4 presents  reduced
form equations which use the predicted class size, computed using the  class size function, as
the key independent  variable, where this was assumed to entail the introduction  of another
teacher when enrollment reaches 38 students.  While this precise level is arbitrary  and point
estimates display some variation, none of the conclusions listed below are sensitive to placing
16 Although the  analysis here centers on  class size, using the  same data  Urquiola et  al.  (2000) find
that in cross-sectional  settings, most conventional  educational inputs like teacher's experience  and textbook
availability,  cannot be shown  to have any systematic effects on test scores either.
17the critical level at 37 or 39.
Column  1 contains  a first  stage regression, where the dependent  variable is the  actual
class size.  Not surprisingly, the  coefficient of interest  is highly significant, and even in this
simple specification, R2 is above 0.5. If class-level observations are used instead, R2 is about
0.44, a level comparable  to  that  found for Israel by Angrist and  Lavy (1999), who also use
data  at this  level of aggregation.  Using class level observations  produces  class size effects
which are greater  in magnitude,  for reasons discussed below.  To take advantage of the more
detailed data,  however, almost all the results  presented here are at the individual level, with
standard  errors adjusted  for clustering  at the  class level.
Columns 3-6 present  analogous specifications, except that  the dependent  variables are
now language  (columns 3 and  4) and math  (columns 5 and  6) scores.  The  coefficients are
significant in  all  cases,  and  their  magnitude  is always greater  than  that  observed in  the
"simple" OLS regressions in Table 2.  Importantly,  adding socioeconomic controls does not
alter the coefficients on class size as much as was the case before, and does not  render them
insignificant.  An exception  is the  final specification  for math  scores,  where the  estinmate
is only significant at  the  10 percent  level.  In contrast,  the  socioeconomic controls are not
as important  in this  setting,  which in part  may reflect smaller variances  for these variables
within the rural  area.
Table 5 presents the actual instrumental  variables results, based on the first stage regres-
sion presented  in Table 4.  For comparison,  columns 1-2 (language)  and  5-6 (math)  present
simple OLS specifications.  For each test  score, the  table  features  two IV regressions. one
without  control variables,  and one that  includes enrollment  and  socioeconomic characteris-
tics.  For both  tests,  and  in  the simplest  univariate  specifications, the  coefficients on class
size are negative and significant in both the OLS and IV regressions. When control variables
are added, however, the  significance in the OLS case is lost, whereas the IV coefficients not
only remain  significant but  become greater  in magnitude,  suggesting larger classes result  in
lower achievement.  Once  again,  for the  case of math  this  is only  true  for the  10 percent
level.  Similar  results  emerge  when other  specifications  of enrollment,  such as its  log, are
used among the control variables.
As stated  above, the  use of the teacher  allocation  rule is based  on the  argument  that
it  "separates"  the effects of enrollment  and  other socioeconomic characteristics  from those
of class size, making  it feasible to  estimate  the  causal effect of the  latter.  If this  strategy
indeed identifies exogenous variation,  these results  confirm the  assertion that  simultaneous
enrollment/class  size and enrollment/SES  correlations cause bias in the usual cross-sectional
estimations,  hiding a negative and significant class size effect.
5.3  Rural  schools:  focusing  on  small  schools
In an earlier section, this paper argued that  concentrating  on "small" towns, those with
a single school and  3rd  grade  enrollment  below 30, might  identify  useful  variation in  class
18size.  In these cases, short  of making what  might be  a rather  costly move, parents  cannot
react  to  a class size level that  arises from the size of their child's birth  cohort,  and schools
are not  large enough to  be candidates for a supplementary  teacher.
Table  6 presents  results  for this  sample.  Because this  strategy  does  not  rely on  an
instrumental  variables technique, the table  covers OLS results  only. For each test,  the first
two columns present estimations on the whole rural sample as a benchmark,  and the following
two focus only on schools with enrollments less than  or equal to 30. The coefficients on class
size are uniformly significant in the  "small town" sample, and in contrast  to all other samples
in OLS specifications, their magnitude is barely affected by the introduction  of socioeconomic
controls.
In short, the key finding here is that  class size has a negative and significant effect among
rural schools in small towns, and that  this may be because enrollment/SES  correlations are
less important  in this  context.  This  may not  be  surprising  to  the  extent  that  one would
expect  enrollment/achievement  links to  be less significant when they arise from differences
in  towns'  population  sizes rather  than  from parental  choice.  Additionally,  of course, the
magnitude  of small towns'  enrollment cohorts will not be determined  just  by their  size, but
also by a random element.  This  point is explored in greater  detail in a subsequent  section.
The sample considered in making this finding is, of course, different from the one used
earlier, and even if the identification strategy  does isolate useful variation in class size, these
effects might be biased up or down relative to those that  would prevail if such variation were
identified for, say, a random sample of the urban  population.
5.4  Rural  schools:  combining  small  schools  with  discontinuities
A natural  extension is to combine the two sources of variation used so far: that  arising
from the focus on "small" schools, and that  related to the use of a class size rule. Because the
former sample provides an adequate  base from which to  build, the latter  can be restricted
to  only those  schools within  narrow  intervals  associated  with  discontinuities  in the enroll-
ment/class  size relationship.  In a sense, this  adds  only the  "higher"  quality  variation from
the IV strategy  to the data  from the  "small" schools approach.
To this  end,  Table  7 implements  regression  (10) for language  and  math  scores.  For
comparison, in each case the first two columns present OLS regressions for this sample, with
the  remaining two focusing on IV specifications.  In the latter,  the  coefficients on class size
become more negative and significant than  those  in Table 6, which applied  to small schools
only, or Table 5, which presented the IV results.  One point these comparisons suggest is that
the  significant effects found among the  small schools, a very particular  set  of institutions,
might not  necessarily be overestimates of those one would observe in larger institutions.
195.5  Possible  sources  of  bias  and  further  results
The results  presented  thus  far consistently suggest that  once strategies  to  address the
endogeneity of class size are put  into place, this variable is found to have negative effects on
achievement.  These approaches  obviously do not substitute  for experimental  evidence, and
will therefore still leave open routes for bias.  This section discusses some of them and, where
possible, presents  some empirical exercises that  provide information  as to their importance.
5.5.1  Geographical  influence  areas  and  school  quality
Up  to  this  point,  the  discussion  has  assumed  that  rural  schools are located  in  and
draw students  from towns.  Among rural schools, however, the realm from which enrollment
originates  will often encompass  a larger,  sparsely  populated  agricultural  area  from which
children walk to school each day.  One reason this  matters  is that  as the  distance to  school
becomes greater,  there  may be  households who deem their  children's  trip  worthwhile only
if the  education  offered is  at  least  of a  given quality.  Additionally,  even though  schools
tend  to be  far apart,  one cannot  rule out the  existence of children  who live at the  margin
of two schools' areas of influence, whose parents could therefore  send them  to the one they
perceived to  be better.  This  implies that  even in rural areas with  theoretically  little  scope
for choice, schools' enrollment and  class sizes, therefore,  may actually  be a function of their
performance on standardized  tests.
While this  is a  relevant issue, it is important  to  note  that  such  an effect would tend
to bias the  estimated  class size effects upward,  making negative and  significant results  like
those observed here harder  to encounter.  An indirect  test of this issue involves augmenting
the  above regressions with  some  variable that  might  capture  quality  and  "school effects"
more generally. One possibility is to take into account the fact that  schools that  have a 6th
in  addition  to  a  3 rd  grade might  be  of higher quality.  This  could be  due to  the  fact that
the institution  may be older and have more experience, or that  the district  principal or local
teachers have been more effective in "lobbying" for the provision of additional instructors  and
infrastructure.  This  idea was implemented by adding a dummy for 6th  grade availability to
some of the above regressions.  While the coefficient on this variable is sometimes significant,
it does not  have a consistent  sign and barely affects the key class size estimates.
5.5.2  Inter-town  differences
Another  way to  deal  with  this  problem  is to  focus  only  on  the  part  of enrollment
variation that  is due to  differences in cohort sizes between years, within towns.  Despite the
fact that  this  significantly restricts  the variation  in class sizes, it may allow further controls
for any enrollment/SES  correlations  that  remain  in comparisons between small towns.  For
instance,  it would seem unlikely  that  teachers  with  given characteristics  would not  want
to live in small towns to  teach  3 rd  grade, but  would not  mind teaching  6th  grade in them.
Further,  to  the  extent  that  Bolivia  has  relatively  high  fertility  rates,  in  many  cases the
20students  in  3 rd  and  6th  grades will come from the  same households, though  the  data  does
not allow one to identify these links.
This  approach  is similar  to  that  used by Hoxby (1999).  The problem  it poses in the
present  context  is that  repeated  observations  are not  available for the  same grade in the
same  town.  Analogous variation,  however, can still  be obtained  if  one focuses on  cross-
cohort differences between the  3 rd  and 6th  grade, both  grade levels covered in the data.' 7
The main disadvantage of this approach comes from the possible presence of differential
drop-out  rates  that  can bias results  in unpredictable  ways.  Towns with  better  schools, for
instance,  will be those in which children tend to remain in school and reach the sixth grade.
All else equal,  such schools will probably  have higher scores than  those  in which students
tend to drop out,  but  they will at the same time have larger class sizes. On the other hand
and  in comparison to  "high drop out"  areas, they will also be retaining  a larger proportion
of poorly performing students.
Implementing  this  strategy  requires selecting only  "small" towns that  contain  schools
that  offer both 3rd and 6th  grade instruction,  which unfortunately  further restricts the sample.
Additionally, both the  3 rd and the 6th grade must have less than 30 students.  Table 8 presents
the results for this  approach, focusing only on language scores and using observations at the
class level.  Columns  1-3 present  regressions without socioeconomic controls, while columns
4-6 incorporate  these. Within  each group, the first regression contains only class size as the
key independent  variable.  In order to  capture  constant  differences between the two grades'
average scores, the second adds  a dummy indicating  whether  the  observation  is at  the  6th
grade level. The coefficient on this dummy is uniformly positive but  not significant.  Finally,
the third column within each group adds town dummies, with which the results rely only on
within town, cross-cohort variation in class sizes. The final specifications do suggest negative
and significant effects.
5.6  Interpretation
Perhaps  due  to  the  controversy  that  surrounds  this  input,  most  work on  class size
focuses on the direction and significance of its  effects. From a policy perspective, of course,
the magnitude of any  potential  gains from class size reduction  is what  matters.  To address
this issue, some papers  use a measure called the  effect size: the implied change in test scores
that  results  from  a  given change in  class size, divided  by the  standard  deviation  of the
score. Using a one standard  deviation change in class size, the above tables have presented
this  statistic  in  brackets.  Finn  and  Achilles (1990) point  out  that  the  effect size will not
be independent  of whether  individual or class average observations are used for test  scores.
Because the variance in the  former is naturally  greater,  studies  which use individual level
observations will tend to find smaller effects.
17 Forthcoming  data  will include  also include  1st grade  results.  To the  extent  that  these can be linked to
the  schools from which these  3rd and  6 th  grade  results  were drawn,  this  will allow a  further  check on these
results.
21Table 9 summarizes the effects found in this paper, comparing them with some encoun-
tered  in  previous  research." 8 The  first two rows show the  effect sizes found by  Finn and
Achi11Ws  (199!) for the STAR experiment,  and Angrist and Lavy (1999) for the case of Israel.
Both of these refer to the proportion  of a standard  deviation change in test scores that  would
be caused by an  eight pupil reduction  in class size. Both  results  display the same orders of
magnitude,  although  the Israel results  are towards the lower limit of the  STAR range. 19
The remaining rows present the effect sizes found in this study  for the two identification
strategies,  and  for their  combination.  This  study has used  "one standard  deviation"  effect
sizes which are not  strictly  comparable to the  "eight student  reduction"  ones presented  for
Finn and Achilles (1990) and  Angrist and Lavy (1999). Nevertheless, because one standard
deviation corresponds to between eight and nine students  in the rural data  (see Table 1), the
interpretation  is similar.  With this caveat, the table shows that  the IV results produced here
are slightly larger than those found by Finn and Achilles (1990) when the student distribution
is the benchmark,  but  within  their range when the class-level standard  deviations  are used
instead.  The small school estimates are not  as large, and  are therefore  closer to those found
for Israel. 20
This table  gives a general notion of how the estimates  presented  compare with others.
A more intuitive  interpretation  is possible by comparing the suggested class size impact with
that  which parental education  implies. To illustrate,  suppose class sizes in rural Bolivia were
reduced by half a standard  deviation,  from about  23 to  19 students.  The  impact  on test
scores Table 5 suggests is roughly similar to  that  suggested by the  dummy for whether the
mother is a high school graduate.
This is a significant impact, an aspect consistent with Moesteller (1995), who emphasizes
that  even if effect sizes seem small, they can be equivalent to substantial  movements along
the test score distribution.  For instance, a 0.30or  effect size in the case of rural schools would
mean that  an  eight student  reduction  in  class size would be  sufficient to  move a student
from the 25th percentile  to the median of the language test score distribution  for the entire
sample.
A further consideration  is that  especially at the grade level considered here, higher test
scores may reflect the acquisition of skills less "marginal" than  those  measured in developed
countries.  Specifically, adequate  performance in the language test at the  3 rd  grade level may
reflect a Bolivian rural  student  is about  to  acquire the literacy  skills requisite  for effective
citizenship in a Spanish-speaking society. This aspect  also suggests some caution  in reading
the comparisons presented in Table 9.
18 This table is partially based on Angrist and Lavy's (1999) discussion  of these topics.
'9Krueger  (1999) presents  generally  similar results  for the  STAR data.
20 Akerhielm  (1995)  and Boozer  and Rouse (1995)  present higher grade results based on NELS for the U.S.
Angrist and Lavy (1999)  point out that the magnitude found by these authors is nevertheless also relatively
close  to theirs.
226  Conclusions
Development practitioners  are increasingly emphasizing education as a key component
of strategies  to achieve growth and equity. Further,  they are keen to  raise schooling quality,
both  because several middle income countries have already achieved a number of enrollment
goals, and because this  may be an effective way to help low income countries achieve theirs.
Hanushek (1995) makes the point, however, that  there may be little economists can reli-
ably tell them on how to allocate scarce resources among educational  inputs.  This shortcom-
ing is particularly  severe if one considers that,  ideally, cost-benefit studies require knowledge
of the magnitude  of certain  effects, and not merely their  direction.
This paper makes the point that  the endogeneity issues that  cause this problem may be
particularly  severe in developing countries.  Specifically, factors like highly unequal  income
distributions,  ethnic  heterogeneity, significant urban/rural  welfare differences, and the pres-
ence of "open"  public school systems,  could lead to  a great  deal of sorting  among schools,
complicating analyses on any number of inputs.
In the case analyzed here, for instance,  the evidence is of positive enrollment/class  size
and enrollment/SES  correlations, which jointly imply that  higher SES and higher achieving
students  may often be not only in larger schools, but also in larger classes, which by itself can
produce class size coefficients of the  "wrong" sign.  This problem underlines the importance
of identifying exogenous variation in input provision in order to generate reliable results.
This  paper  has  attempted  to  do this  in the  case of class size, building  two empirical
strategies  that  are based on the institutional  characteristics  of educational  provision in the
rural area of Bolivia. When these are implemented, the data  reveal negative and significant
class size effects, not  so different in  magnitude  from  those  found  in  recent  experimental
or quasi-experimental  studies.  These significant results  might serve as a starting  point for
further work on this topic in the Bolivian setting,  which would ideally include experimental
designs.
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25Table  1:
Descriptive  statistics  by  type  of  school
Total  Urban  Urban  Rural
private  public  public
Test  scores:
Sample size  10,018  1,139  5,285  3,594
Language  score:  mean  49.8  58.2  49.8  47.2
Language  score: std.  dev.  9.3  8.2  8.4  9.3
Math  score: mean  53.2  60.8  53.2  50.9
Math  score:  std.  dev.  9.2  6.9  8.4  9.7
Class  characteristics:
Sample size  608  46  252  310
3rd  grade  (school) enrollment:  mean  63.3  77.6  91.7  38.2
3rd grade  (school) enrollment:  std.  dev.  44.1  59.6  39.0  27.4
3rd grade  class size:  mean  29.9  37.4  35.5  23.3
3rd grade  class size: std.  dev.  9.9  9.8  6.4  8.4
No.  of 3rd  grade  classes in school: mean  1.6  1.4  2.2  1.3
% of classes with blackboard'  95.2  100.0  94.5  94.3
% of students  with textbooks2 36.2  99.1  40.3  23.4
% of classrooms  with libraries3 18.5  39.5  9.9  22.4
Teachers'  characteristics:
Sample  size  608  46  252  310
Mean  age  40.0  45.1  41.7  38.1
% with  Spanish  as first language  80.0  89.2  85.5  74.5
% with degree  79.3  97.6  82.5  74.1
% in categories  1-2 (top)4 21.1  46.4  25.5  14.0
% in categories  3-44  24.3  33.2  27.8  20.4
% in categories  5-64  19.7  16.0  27.4  14.6
%  in category  7 or without  category4 34.9  4.4  19.3  51.0
Students'  characteristics:
Sample  size  10,018  1,139  5,285  3,594
Mean age  9.2  8.7  9.1  9.5
% with  Spanish  as first language  75.0  93.3  81.2  60.2
% that  works at  least  occasionally  67.9  40.2  62.9  84.1
% whose mother  finished at least  grade  school  87.3  99.5  90.6  78.6
% whose mother  finished at  least  middle school  47.1  91.2  50.9  27.5
% whose mother  finished  at least  high school  30.6  82.5  31.4  12.9
% whose mother  has  at  least  some higher ed.  14.0  53.9  11.7  4.8
% whose mother  has at  least  college degree  3.8  20.1  2.4  0.8
% whose hhld.  has sewage system  30.7  74.1  35.8  9.6
% whose hhld.  has  a phone  line  17.5  71.7  15.9  2.7
Note:  The  sample size refers to the  total  number  of observations  in each category.
Not  all variables  had  valid data  for that  many  observations.
1 The teacher  responds  he/she  always has these  inputs.
2  The teacher  responds  that  more than  half of students  have textbooks.
3  The teacher  indicates  his/her  classroom has  a set of reference  textbooks.
4  Categories  correspond  to teachers'  position  in the  pay scale.
26Table  2:
Dependent  variable:  language  score
Sample:  3rd  grade
Full  Urban  Urban  Rural
sample  private  public  public
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Panel  A
Constant  46.8***  61.6***  54.5***  55.6***  49.9***
(1.2)  (1.6)  (2.8)  (2.2)  (1.4)
Class  size  0.093**  -0.086**  0.093  -0.156**  -0.102*
(0.037)  (0.036)  (0.065)  (0.060)  (0.057)
[0.09]  [-0.08]  [0.11]  [-0.12]  [-0.09]
Urban  Public  -8.6***
(0.9)
Rural  Public
R2  0.008  0.125  0.012  0.013  0.009
No. of students  9,993  9,993  1,139  5,260  3,594
No. of classes  589  589  46  245  298
Panel  B
Constant  49.0***  59.1***  57.1***  51.6***  48.2***
(0.7)  (1.0)  (1.4)  (1.0)  (0.7)
Enrollment  0.011  -0.011*  0.013  -0.018*  -0.024*
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.013)
[0.05]  [-0.05]  [0.09]  [-0.081  [-0.07]
Urban  Public  -8.2***
(0.9)
Rural  Public  11.4***
_______________  ~~(1.0)
R2  0.003  0.122  0.008  0.007  0.005
No. of students  9,993  9,993  1,139  5,260  3,594
No. of classes  589  589  46  245  298
- significant  at  the  10, 5 and  1 percent  level, respectively.
1) Huber-White  standard  errors  are in parentheses.
2) Brackets  contain  the  proportion  of a standard  deviation  change
in the  dependent  variable  brought  about  by increasing  the
independent  variable  by one standard  deviation.
3) Standard  errors  are adjusted  for clustering  at  the class level.
See Moulton  (1986).
27Table  3:
Dependent  variable: language score
Sample:  3rd grade
Full  Urban  Urban  Rural
sample  private  public  public
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Constant  46.8***  49.3***  54.5***  46.9***  55.6***  53.7***  49.9***  51.3***
(1.2)  (1.1)  (2.8)  (3.5)  (2.2)  (1.9)  (1.4)  (2.0)
Class  size  0.093**  -0.005  0.093  0.052  -0.156** -0.099*  -0.102*  -0.088
(0.037)  (0.033)  (0.065)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.052)  (0.057)  (0.083)
[0.09]  [-0.01]  [0.11]  [0.06]  [-0.12]  [-0.07]  [-0.09]  [-0.08]
Enrollment  -0.007  0.005  -0.012  -0.016
(0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.021)
Student speaks Spanish only  1.80***  2.20  1.59***  1.28*
(0.43)  (1.31)  (0.52)  (0.75)
Student works at least part time  -2.60***  -1.10  -2.62***  -1.78**
(0.31)  (0.77)  (0.35)  (0.76)
Mother completed grade school  -0.61  0.24  -0.48  -1.23**
(0.39)  (2.41)  (0.41)  (0.60)
°°  Mother completed middle school  -0.22  -0.11  0.22  -0.70
(0.45)  (2.41)  (0.48)  (0.76)
Mother completed high school  1.50***  4.32  0.96*  1.61*
(0.47)  (2.74)  (0.53)  (0.85)
Mother has some higher ed.  3.41***  5.72**  2.67***  1.53
(0.52)  (2.73)  (0.64)  (1.03)
Mother is a college  graduate  4.84***  6.67**  2.81***  0.52
(0.66)  (2.82)  (1.06)  (1.68)
Hhld. has access to sewage  sys.  1.66***  1.53  0.99**  1.68*
(0.35)  (0.99)  (0.41)  (0.97)
Hhld. has a phone connection  3.72***  2.19***  2.24***  1.03
(0.44)  (0.80)  (0.42)  (1.18)
R:z  0.008  0.158  0.012  0.172  0.013  0.093  0.009  0.037
No. of students  9,993  9,993  1,139  1,139  5,260  5,260  3,594  3,594
No. of classes  589  589  46  46  245  245  298  298
- significant  at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
1) Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.
2) Brackets contain the proportion of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable brought
about by increasing  the independent variable by one standard deviation.
3) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the class level. See Moulton (1986).Table  4:
Reduced  form regressions for rural  public schools
Sample:  3rd  grade
Class  Language  Math
size  score  score
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  4.85***  6.79***  51.2***  53.1***  55.4***  56.1***
(1.27)  (1.58)  (1.6)  (1.7)  (1.6)  (1.8)
Predicted  class size  0.84***  0.65***  -0.155***  -0.190**  -0.177** -0.146*
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.059)  (0.079)  (0.059)  (0.083)
[-0.12]  [-0.15]  [-0.13]  [-0.11]
Enrollment  0.072***  0.000  -0.024
(0.016)  (0.018)  (0.019)
Student speaks Spanish only  0.20  1.20  1.42**
(0.56)  (0.73)  (0.68)
Student works at least part time  -0.25  -1.79**  -1.49*
(0.28)  (0.77)  (0.70)
Mother completed grade school  0.00  -1.18*  -0.91
(0.38)  (0.61)  (0.64)
Mother completed middle school  0.14  -0.63  -0.26
(0.54)  (0.78)  (0.77)
Mother completed high school  -0.02  1.76**  0.96
(0.65)  (0.88)  (0.88)
Mother has some higher ed.  -1.02  1.80*  2.69***
(0.69)  (1.04)  (1.02)
Mother is a college  graduate  -1.68**  0.95  2.65*
(0.81)  (1.69)  (1.60)
Hhld. has access to sewage  system  -0.53  1.83*  1.76**
(0.36)  (0.98)  (0.83)
Hhld. has a phone connection  -0.04  1.09  2.69**
(0.50)  (1.19)  (1.02)
R2  0.520  0.552  0.014  0.044  0.017  0.047
No. of students  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594
No. of classes  298  298  298  298  298  298
,**,  *** - significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
1) Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.
2) Brackets contain the proportion of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable brought
about by increasing  the independent variable by one standard deviation.
3) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the class level. See Moulton (1986).
29Table  5:
Instrumental  variables  regressions  for  rural  public  schools
Sample:  3rd  grade
Language  score  Math  score
OLS  IV  OLS  IV
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Constant  49.9***  51.3***  52.1***  55.1***  54.1***  54.7***  56.5*4*  57.7***
(1.4)  (2.0)  (1.9)  (2.4)  (1.4)  (1.7)  (1.9)  (2.6)
Class size  -0.102*  -0.088  -0.184*** -0.292**  -0.121**  -0.062  -0.210*** -0.224*
(0.057)  (0.083)  (0.070)  (0.122)  (0.053)  (0.073)  (0.070)  (0.128)
[-0.09]  [-0.08]  [-0.17]  [-0.261  [-0.11]  [-0.05]  [-0-18]  [-0.20]
Enrollment  -0.016  0.022  -0.038  -0.008
(0.021)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.027)
Student  speaks  Spanish only  1.28*  1.25*  1.49**  1.47**
(0.75)  (0.74)  (0.69)  (0.69)
Student  works at  least part  time  -1.78**  -1.86**  -1.48**  -1.55
(0.76)  (0.77)  (0.69)  (0.71)
Mother  completed  grade school  -1.23**  -1.18*  -0.95  -0.91
(0.60)  (0.61)  (0.63)  (0.64)
CD  Mother  completed  middle school  -0.70  -0.59  -0.32  -0.23
(0.76)  (0.78)  (0.77)  (0.77)
Mother  completed  high school  1.61*  1.75**  0.84  0.96
(0.85)  (0.88)  (0.87)  (0.88)
Mother  has some higher ed.  1.53  1.50  2.49**  2.46'
(1.03)  (1.05)  (1.00)  (1.01)
Mother  is a college graduate  0.52  0.46  2.32  2.27
(1.68)  (1.71)  (1.62)  (1.64)
Hhld.  has access to sewage sys.  1.68*  1.68*  1.64**  1.64**
(0.97)  (0.98)  (0.83)  (0.83)
Hhld.  has  a phone  connection  1.03  1.08  2.65***  2.68***
2  ~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~(1.18)  (1.19)  (1.01)  (1.02)
R2  0.009  0.037  0.014  0.044  0.011  0.043  0.017  0.047
No.  of students  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594  3,594
No. of classes  298  298  298  298  298  298  298  298
*m  #*,  *-  significant  at  the  10, 5 and 1 percent  level, respectively.
1) IIubei-White  standard  errors  are ii  parenitheses.
2) Brackets  contain  the proportion  of a standard  deviation  change in the  dependent  variable brought
about  by increasing  the  independent  variable  by one standard  deviation.
3) Standard  errors are  adjusted  for clustering  at  the class level. See Moulton  (1986).Table  6:
Regressions  for all rural schools  and rural schools  with enrollments of 30 or less
Sample:  3rd grade
Language score  Math  score
All  Schools  with  All  Schools  with
Rural  enrollments  Rural  enrollments
Schools  below  30  Schools  below 30
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Constant  49.9***  51.3***  51.9***  53.8***  54.1***  54.7***  55.8***  56.7***
(1.4)  (2.0)  (2.1)  (2.4)  (1.4)  (1.7)  (2.1)  (2.6)
Class size  -0.102*  -0.088  -0.218**  -0.225**  -0.121** -0.062  -0.189** -0.194**
(0.057)  (0.083)  (0.102)  (0.098)  (0.053)  (0.073)  (0.092)  (0.099)
[-0.09]  [-0.08]  [-0.13]  [-0.14]  [-0.11]  [-0.05]  [-0.12]  [-0.12]
Enrollment  -0.016  -0.038
(0.021)  (0.019)
Student speaks Spanish only  1.28*  1.53  1.49**  1.67
(0.75)  (0.96)  (0.69)  (1.07)
Student works at least part time  -1.78**  -2.40**  -1.48**  -1.93
(0.76)  (1.22)  (0.69)  (1.23)
cIQ  Mother completed grade school  -1.23**  -1.00  -0.95  -0.49
(0.60)  (0.84)  (0.63)  (0.94)
Mother completed middle school  -0.70  -1.63  -0.32  0.07
(0.76)  (1.11)  (0.77)  (1.21)
Mother completed high school  1.61*  0.88  0.84  0.12
(0.85)  (1.33)  (0.87)  (1.54)
Mother has some higher ed.  1.53  1.07  2.49**  2.83*
(1.03)  (1.61)  (1.00)  (1.51)
Mother is a college  graduate  0.52  2.34  2.32  3.23
(1.68)  (2.30)  (1.62)  (3.86)
Hhld. has access to sewage sys.  1.68*  0.71  1.64**  1.90
(0.97)  (2.30)  (0.83)  (2.42)
Hhld. has a phone connection  1.03  0.50  2.65***  1.27
(1.19)  (1.82)  (1.01)  (1.37)
Rt 2 0.009  0.037  0.018  0.041  0.011  0.043  0.012  0.032
No. of students  3,594  3,594  1,555  1,555  3,594  3,594  1,555  1,555
No. of classes  298  298  159  159  298  298  159  159
*,  **,  ***  - significant  at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
1) Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.
2) Brackets contain the proportion of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable brought
about by increasing the independent variable by one standard deviation.
3) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the class level. See Moulton (1986).Table  7:
Rural public schools with  enrollments  under 31 and those  "close" to discontinuities
Sample:  3rd grade
Language score  Math score
OLS  IV  OLS  IV
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Constant  49.9***  51.1***  53.2***  56.9***  54.6***  55.3***  57.1***  59.3**
(2.2)  (3.0)  (2.2)  (2.7)  (1.9)  (2.3)  (2.2)  (2.9)
Class size  -0.105  -0.134  -0.250***  -0.545**  -0.128  -0.132  -0.233** -0.417**
(0.104)  (0.136)  (0.088)  (0.218)  (0.080)  (0.109)  (0.094)  (0.179)
[-0.09]  [-0.11]  [-0.21]  [-0.45]  [-0.10]  [-0.10]  [-0.18]  [-0.33]
Enrollment  0.025  0.170  0.002  0.102
(0.060)  (0.110)  (0.058)  (0.082)
Student speaks Spanish only  2.00  1.58  1.57*  1.28
(1.03)  (1.00)  (0.92)  (0.96)
Student works at  least part time  -1.86*  -2.23*  -1.19  -1.46
(1.05)  (1.14)  (1.05)  (1.14)
Mother completed grade school  -1.61**  -1.21  -1.21  -0.93
(0.69)  (0.79)  (0.77)  (0.79)
Mother completed middle school  -1.41  -0.86  -0.86  -0.48
(1.01)  (1.31)  (1.05)  (1.09)
Mother completed high school  1.24  1.98  0.72  1.23
(1.13)  (1.37)  (1.29)  (1.36)
Mother has some higher ed.  1.27  1.35  3.03**  3.09**
(1.43)  (1.58)  (1.27)  (1.38)
Mother is a college  graduate  -1.13  0.92  2.18  3.61
(2.79)  (3.02)  (3.57)  (3.52)
Hhld. has access to sewage system  2.44*  2.71*  1.87  2.06
(1.32)  (1.38)  (1.40)  (1.39)
Hhld. has a phone connection  0.75  0.83  2.13  2.20
(1.73)  (1.94)  (1.34)  (1.59)
R2  0.008  0.045  0.026  0.080  0.010  0.036  0.021  0.052
N  2,252  2,252  2,252  2,252  2,252  2,252  2,252  2,252
No. of classes  209  209  209  209  209  209  209  209
- significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
1) Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.
2) Brackets contain the proportion of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable brought
about by increasing the independent variable by one standard deviation.
3) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the class level. See Moulton (1986).Table  8:
Dependent  variable: grade-specific language score
Within  town variation
Class-level observations
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  51.9***  51.8***  49.3***  44.4***  44.1***  50.4**
(1.9)  (2.1)  (1.5)  (4.8)  (4.9)  (6.7)
Class size  -0.224** -0.223** -0.183**  -0.119  -0.113  -0.181**
(0.091)  (0.092)  (0.079)  (0.088)  (0.089)  (0.078)
[-0.18]  [-0.18]  [-0.14]  [-0.09]  [-0.09]  [-0.14]
6th grade  0.154  0.337  0.563  0.345
(1.169)  (0.533)  (1.120)  (1.638)
Student speaks Spanish only  6.57***  6.59***  5.17
(1.47)  (1.47)  (4.20)
Student works at least part time  -6.20*  -6.35*  -0.75
(3.58)  (3.60)  (5.40)
Mother completed grade school  9.26***  9.41*** -3.21
(3.43)  (3.44)  (4.48)
Mother completed middle school  9.91**  9.78**  -6.99
(4.28)  (4.30)  (6.43)
Mother completed high school  4.97  5.07  -3.14
(6.80)  (6.82)  (10.92)
Mother has some higher ed.  13.29  13.68  2.13
(11.70)  (11.75)  (14.31)
Mother is a college  graduate  25.82  26.60  27.94
(44.16)  (44.28)  (48.90)
Hhld. has access to sewage system  -7.67  -7.67  -2.28
(11.56)  (11.59)  (17.24)
Hhld. has a phone connection  0.55  0.67  -2.29
(5.53)  (5.55)  (16.07)
Town dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
R2  0.031  0.032  0.903  0.227  0.228  0.914
N  190  190  190  190  190  190
*, **,  ***  - significant  at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
1) Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.
2) Brackets contain the proportion of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable brought
about by increasing the independent variable by one standard deviation.
3) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the class level. See Moulton (1986).
33Table  9:
Summary  of effect  sizes  and  comparisons
Study/estimate/effect  Relative  Relative
to the  to the
student  class mean
distribution  distribution
Finn  and Achilles (1990)  0.13u-0.27u  0.32u-0.66ca
Angrist  and Lavy (1999)  0.10f-0.20a  0.36a
This study:  IV estimates  0.  17of-0.26a  0.34a-0.55o
This  study:  "small" school estimates  0.18cr-0.23a  0.19u-0.37a
This study:  "mixed" strategy  0.18o(-0.45a  0.20u-0.39a
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Note:  I) The X axis features class size as found by the testing system (based on the teachers declaration).
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2) The figure  uses class-level  observations for the 3rd. grade.
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Note: 1)  The figure  plots averages  (by  enrollment  level)  of. actual and predicted  class sizes;  and of  math and language  scores.
2) The figure uses  class-level  observations  for the 3rd. grade.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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